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Between formal and informal: the shakeout in China’s online video industry 
Elaine Jing Zhao 
Introduction 
Chinese media is often characterised by a lack of autonomy and dependence on 
conservative regulatory bodies. Until the mid-1990s the Chinese government defined 
all broadcast media as public institutions (shiye); in addition to being owned by the 
state media ‘units’ were severely restricted by the Chinese Communist Party 
consensus that their primary role was to educate and enlighten the ‘people’ 
(renmin). Many approaches to China’s media have therefore focused on the 
regulatory architecture that governs, and in many cases hinders China’s media from 
being competitive (Brady, 2008; Donald et al., 2002; Lee, 2000; Lynch, 1999; Yu, 
2009; X. Zhang and Zheng, 2009; Zhao, 1998, 2008; Zhu and Berry, 2009).  
    These ‘traditional’ structures have come under increasing pressure as China has 
engaged with the global internet economy. As a result of its entry into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 and commitments made to liberalise 
media markets, Chinese media industry players have seen a version of ‘creative 
destruction’ playing out: namely significant changes in industry boundaries and entry 
barriers; reform of regulatory frameworks limiting competitive entry; an erosion of 
protected market positions; and the destruction of technological assumptions 
(McKnight et al., 2001).   
    This article focuses on a period following a much publicised government 
crackdown on infringing video sites in 2008. It begins with a brief introduction of 
formal and informal media economies and their development in the Chinese audio-
visual market. Next it provides a further discussion of media piracy in China. It then 
explains the background behind the Administrative Provisions on Internet Audio-
Visual Program Service. This article argues that the shutdown of infringing online 
video sites caused a loss of cultural diversity; in particular it discouraged the 
communities of practice that had grown up around user-generated content (UGC) in 
China.  This article also shows how the crackdown led to a resurgence of street 
vendor piracy (Yan, 2010). Next it looks at changes in industry boundaries and 
  
structures as infringing players and other well-financed new players attempted to 
move into the formal sector and play by the new rules. Following this the article 
examines responses of the formal sector and consequences of professionalization. 
The competition in professional content acquisition following the new regime 
resulted in skyrocketing costs in copyright content purchase, which pressured 
industry players to experiment with alternative content strategies and business 
models. Finally, this article looks at means by which UGC is being reconstituted. 
Reflecting the theme of creative destruction, there is an increasing rapprochement 
between professional and user-created content, leading to a new relationship 
between formal and informal sectors.  
 
Formal and informal media economies 
Against a backdrop of unprecedented change in media industries globally ongoing 
tension is evident between formal and informal media economies. While formal 
economic activity is generally understood as lying within the legally sanctioned 
media economy, informal media economy is located outside of state statistics and 
regulatory scope (Lobato and Thomas, 2011). However, the two are not totally 
separated. Cunningham (2012) notes that the boundaries between the market and 
household sectors are increasingly blurring and there is a rapid co-evolution of the 
two sectors in the media landscapes of many developed economies.  
    In order to understand the transformation of the media market in China, it is 
important to consider both formal and informal world, as well as the dynamics 
between the two. While most current literature on the informal economy in China is 
drawn from labour sociology (e.g. Guang, 2005; Huang, 2009), the transformations 
brought by digital technologies and the role of the state in the dynamics between 
the informal and the formal economy in the post-WTO era have much to offer in 
research. This dynamism is linked to the exponential growth of China’s online 
community, now estimated at over 530 million (CNNIC, 2012). 
 
  
    Over the past two decades the audio-visual market in China has been dominated 
by a few key institutions backed by the government; due to stringent censorship 
controls content innovation has been relatively stagnant and distribution 
geographically constrained. The dominant players have been China Central TV (in 
television) and the China Film Group (in cinema).   
    Alongside the formal structures, the media landscape of China is characterized by 
complex informal markets; these range from peripatetic street vendors to 
backrooms of legitimate DVD and video stores. Over the past decade restrictive 
censorship and strict import quotas on overseas content have created a vacuum, 
leading to the growth of pirate VCD and DVD. In 2001, the average price of 
legitimate Blu-ray disc was between 80RMB-200RMB while pirated versions were 
available between 10RMB-20RMB (Chen, 2011).  Consumers could purchase pirated 
DVD movies at 7 to 10 RMB, or rent TV dramas from rental stores at daily fees 
ranging from 0.5 to 3 RMB per disc (Rong, 2008). 
In the emerging internet economy, however, where an expanding range of content 
is increasingly available online and less geographically constrained, the picture is 
different. Most viewers no longer bothered with DVDs; they could simply share and 
access film and TV online. A host of powerful players have moved center stage: these 
include Tudou and Youku, independent online video service providers; as well as 
Baidu, China’s dominant search engine; Sohu, an internet service provider; and 
Shanda, a leading interactive entertainment company. To a large extent these 
internet-based companies have exploited informal media economies and have 
begun to build alliances with a range of content providers including traditional media 
channels. In the informal sector, major players include BTChina, VeryCD, and Xunlei 
which were based on peer-to-peer sharing technologies. 
 
The cultural contradictions of piracy in China 
In China the production, distribution and consumption of counterfeit, fake and 
knockoffs is pervasive (Pang, 2008). Products range from copycat designer clothing, 
‘shanzhai’ mobile phones (Keane and Zhao, 2012) to pirated VCD and DVDs of 
  
overseas films. These economic activities are usually located in the realm of an 
informal economy (Lobato and Thomas, 2011). As in the case of most other Asian 
countries, lack of IP laws and weak implementation of laws are major contributing 
factors in China (Bettig, 1997). In terms of the supply and demand, Yar (2005) and 
Karaganis (2011) show that the high price of content has been a contributing factor 
in piracy activities. Wang (2003) explains how cheap labour and long coastlines make 
production and export viable. On a cultural level, Alford (1995) notes how the 
notions of individual creativity and ownership of ideas were in contrast with 
Confucian concepts of creativity, knowledge and learning, which contributes to 
infringing behaviour among consumers. 
    The increasing adoption of digital technologies now means easier reproduction 
and distribution of online content, including online piracy. Industry bodies like The 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) claim that the exponential growth of 
piracy costs the industry significant losses. However, many have argued that data 
needs to be treated with caution. This is because extrapolation from detection, 
seizure and conviction counts are problematic; pirate copies do not necessarily 
displace a sale at a standard market price; moreover, reduction in ‘gross revenues’, 
rather than on net loss to the industries, is often exaggerated (Wang, 2003; Yar, 
2005). Similarly, Anderson (2009) argues that piracy should be estimated not so 
much in terms of loss but more in terms of ‘lesser gain’.   
    Choi and Perez (2007) argue that online piracy is an important source of 
technological and strategic innovation to both industry incumbent and newcomers. 
Similarly, Lobato suggests that piracy can be an alternative distribution system for 
media content, better understood as ‘an enabling energy’ rather than - or as well as - 
a form of economic parasitism’ (Lobato, 2008: 33). More recent research by 
Karaganis (2011) demonstrates that the growth of digital piracy has disrupted a wide 
range of media business models and has created opportunities in emerging 
economies for price and service innovations.  
 
  
    Complicating the issue, moreover, is the knowledge that piracy networks remain 
part of the formal economy (Nordstrom, 2000). Wang maintains that they ‘operate 
through and around formal institutions such as the state, its regulatory and 
enforcement capacities, and its sovereignty’ (2003: 74-75). The interdependent and 
often complex relationships between formal and informal economies therefore 
require closer examination. As Cunningham and Silver suggest, ‘downloading and 
P2P file sharing needs to be analysed in its own right, as well as in its complex 
relations to off-line piracy... the way in which it forces change in the formal economy 
and engenders state action; and the extent to which it has to be factored into the 
business models of on-line distribution companies’ (2012: 59). 
 
Online video distribution in China  
Free video downloading in China can be traced back to the launch of eDonkey in 
2000. Various BitTorrent platforms soon emerged after that, including BTChina 
which was launched in 2003. The main target for online piracy is overseas films and 
TV serials, mostly Hollywood productions and US, European, Japanese and Korean TV 
serials. These sites attracted a large number of users and leading domestic brand 
owners have sought to enlist overseas stars for celebrity endorsement (The 
Economist 2010).  
    Not long after the launch of YouTube in 2005 and its acquisition by Google one 
year later, online video sites mushroomed in China. A multitude of service providers 
began to address different user needs: these included video sharing site reliant on 
UGC, either original or remixed works, and sites specialising in video-on-demand 
(VOD) and live broadcasting of professionally produced content. Online video sites 
became an alternative distribution channel for TV and films. According to the annual 
report on the progress of China’s media industry released by the State 
Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) (2009a), the gap between the 
release windows of online and cinema distribution was narrowing.  
  
    The development of online distribution of films and TV series can be attributed 
largely to the unmet demand in theatres and on TV and the rapid development of 
digital technologies. In the film market, there are a limited number of screens to 
service the population. From 2005 to 2008 box office revenue in China grew 29%, 
but the number of screens only grew 15% (Wang, 2009). As theatrical distribution 
cannot meet the demand of increasing number of movie goers, online distribution 
helps both big and small productions reach the mass market.  
    Until recently China maintained a tight import quota of 20 foreign films a year. In 
February 2012, about one year after the deadline given by the WTO for China to lift 
its film import quota, the number of premium format films entering screen space 
was raised by an extra 14. In effect, the quota is still in place (Abrams, 2012). Limiting 
international access to China’s market while allowing foreign investment and skill 
transfer is an important strategy of the government to help domestic industry to 
develop a competitive advantage (Montgomery, 2010).  
    Tight import quotas have had the effect of driving many viewers to access 
overseas productions through online video services. The efficiency of the online 
subtitling communities makes it easier for viewers with less foreign linguistic literacy. 
As overseas movies and television shows are rarely shown on Chinese television 
channels, Chinese youth turn to the internet for a greater variety of programs (Lee, 
2009).  
    Strict censorship has also limited the number of films available to viewers, which 
creates market opportunities for online video distribution. The Sixth Generation 
directors’ underground films, often banned by the government while winning prizes 
at international film festivals, are viewed on pirated DVDs and via online 
downloading (Tudou, 2011). Similarly, despite a large number of TV production 
companies in China, broadcasting is still tightly controlled by the state (Xu, 2012).  
    Further, the development of broadband and file-sharing technologies has made 
for easier transmission of big videos online. Online distribution of films and TV series 
has increased significantly. According to the 27th Statistical Report on Internet 
Development in China (CNNIC, 2011a), by the end of December 2010, 62% of 
  
internet users watch videos online. Film and TV drama were the most favoured 
content by users, attracting 93% and 87% of online video users respectively by the 
end of 2010 (CNNIC, 2011). 
 
A watershed moment: reform of regulatory boundaries  
In 2008 , the Administrative Provisions on Internet Audio-Visual Program Service (the 
Provisions) released by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) 
and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) (SARFT and MIIT, 
2007), dealt a blow to the large number of privately held BT-based online video 
websites. As SARFT explained on its official website:  
In recent years some web sites spread a large number of pirated films, TV 
dramas and other programs publicly… The Chinese government has been 
called upon and urged both nationally and internationally to take legal 
actions against these web sites. BT sites were distributing audio and 
video content and didn’t have the ‘Information Network Communicated 
Audio-Video Program License’ issued by the SARFT. They were 
unauthorized to provide Internet audio-visual program services (SARFT, 
2009b).     
    While the legal grounds for the new measures were framed as an issue of licensing, 
clearly pressure from domestic and international copyright owners caused the state 
to move. In addition to international commercial interests, internal political 
demands were a factor in the attempts to demolish the piracy market; this is evident 
from several big antipiracy propaganda campaigns that the government carried out. 
Pang (2006) notes however that unmet demand from audiences and attendant 
enforcement difficulties—including corruption at the provincial level in the street 
raids and transnational mobility of the production and distribution networks—have 
severely hampered the state’s anti-piracy efforts. Moreover, abundant job 
opportunities provided by the piracy market are another factor in weak enforcement 
of copyright law by the state. 
 
  
    In effect the Provisions attempted to both appease the international community 
and extend domestic ideological control online. It also reflected the state’s intention 
to capture the opportunity in online video distribution when the market had grown 
big enough. The Provisions required online video business operators to obtain 
programming permits or shut down their businesses. Companies applying for 
internet audio-visual service permits had to be ‘legal persons, fully state-owned or 
state ownership-controlled, with no law breaching records in the prior three years’. 
The ‘state-ownership’ requirement only applied to video websites launched after the 
Provisions was released. This signalled an exemption for existing privately owned 
video websites. The Provisions subsequently served as a protective barrier. It is 
undeniable, however, that the Provisions raised the entry barrier of the industry and 
almost put an end to the businesses in the informal sector. 
    As a result of the state intervention, widely adopted peer-to-peer sharing sites 
such as BTChina, btbbt and yyets were either shut down by the government, or gave 
up download services. The shutdown of the major BitTorrent-based sites came as a 
shock for users, as they saw the letters to users and the dead links on the frequented 
sites. Overnight the shutdowns became a hot topic among users in a wide range of 
online forums. Some viewers even initiated online mourning for the websites, 
uploading portraits for the deceased and expressing their disappointment and 
sadness. One of the often-seen quotes was ‘How can I live without you – BT!’ (Yan, 
2010).  
    Apart from user disappointment, the disappearance of the infringing sites was a 
serious blow to cultural diversity of the online video market. Overseas content and 
genres including time-travel, fantasy, and reality shows, which were banned or 
restricted by SARFT, became hard to access again. From being allowed to break the 
limitations on space, time, language and culture and have some degree of autonomy 
(Gubbins, 2012), viewers were thrown back to a market dominated by a limited 
range of domestic productions.  
 
  
    The crackdown also hurt the collaborative culture emerging from the peer-to-peer 
sharing sites. Viewers used these sites to build an online library of content which 
could not be found elsewhere. Fansubbing groups voluntarily devoted time and 
effort to translating, editing and uploading subtitles for overseas productions. The 
coordinated efforts of the volunteers across different parts of China became a public 
service for the fans of American or other overseas films and TV dramas. The sharing 
spirit and collaborative culture was a part of online users’ lives, restructuring their 
social relationships and lifestyle. 
    Overall, the wave of shutdowns diminished the role of piracy as a cultural 
mediator for Chinese viewers who desire modernity (Pang, 2006). The sudden loss of 
community was a significant stumbling block for service providers who need to 
attract users in a competitive market. While the closure of unlicensed websites 
directed users to licensed ones, that did not, however, mean an end to infringing 
content.  
    The shutdown of BT websites led to the resurgence of pirate DVDs found in 
subway stations or on street corners, which had died down to some degree when 
piracy moved online (Yan, 2010). The vendors were clearly aware of the shutdown of 
BT sites, and the price of a piece of D9 DVD rose from 9RMB to 10RMB (Luo, 2009). 
This resurgence of street vendor piracy reveals close relationships between online 
and offline informal economies. The rise of the price of pirate DVDs further reflected 
strong consumer demand. For the state, this migration of piracy back to the offline 
domain adds to the difficulty of control, and did not serve the intended purpose of 
the crackdown. Furthermore, the shutdown of BT sites did not put an end to 
downloading and sharing technologies, and other ‘traditional’ ways of sharing, such 
as exchanging hard drives for the content. That being said, the state action did 
impact on both formal and informal sectors, which will be discussed further below. 
 
Changes in industry boundaries and entry barriers 
The licensing requirement accelerated the industry shakeout. Under the Provisions, 
SARFT closed down 162 websites that did not obtain legal licenses to operate by 31 
  
March 2009 (Liao, 2009). Some of the most popular destinations such as BTChina.net 
and bt.ydy.com were shut down in December 2009. BTChina’s founder Huang Xiwei 
established the website out of personal interest in 2003, offering popular TV shows 
and movies, particularly the latest US shows and Hollywood hits. The site attracted 
more than 250,000 visits daily according to Alexa internet ranking. Huang was not 
very surprised at the shutdown as BTChina was effectively an informal operation 
(Sheng and Gu, 2009).  
    With the Provisions stipulating that only wholly state-owned or state-held 
corporations can apply for the license, a host of new players entered the sector. By 
December 2008, SARFT granted 332 licenses to online video service providers 
(SARFT, 2008), the majority of which were state-owned TV stations, radio stations, 
and news media at national, provisional, and local levels.  
    For those private companies wishing to continue operation, they were pressured 
to apply for the license and seek a path to the formal sector. A few companies 
including K6, Tudou and Youku were among the first of this group to have gained the 
license. VeryCD, a Bit-Torrent download site, submitted its application in December 
2009 and had not obtained the license until August 2012, after putting a stop to its 
downloading service and opting for streaming legitimate content (VeryCD, 2012).   
    One of the most noteworthy service providers who made their way to the formal 
sector with legitimate content was Xunlei. It is the provider of the popular Xunlei 
download manager, which allows users to download a wide variety of TV programs 
and films at a fast speed. When this product was launched in 2003 it attracted a 
large population of users. According to iResearch, it became the most popular 
download acceleration application in China with a 78.7% market share in China’s 
download software market as of February 2011 (Xunlei, 2012). However, most 
content that users downloaded was infringing content. In 2007, under pressure from 
copyright holders, Xunlei announced a service called ‘Claim Copyrights’ that enabled 
copyright owners to claim their content on Xunlei's platform, which would then be 
taken down (Qiu, 2007).  
 
  
    Later that year, the company launched Xunlei Kankan, an online video streaming 
service, which claimed to host only licensed content. This move reflects a trend for 
service providers to move from downloading to streaming service, which has the 
distinct advantage in reducing burdens of storage space. Such a trend is already 
evident in international music and film markets, contributing to the decline of 
ownership of media content (Gubbins, 2012). According to iResearch, Xunlei Kankan 
became one of the top 3 video streaming portals in China with 120.7 million monthly 
unique visitors as of April 2011 (Xunlei, 2012). Xunlei’s desire to operate formally is 
illustrated by an investment of 100million RMB in copyright content purchase in 
2010; and a further investment in film copyright of 200million RMB was made in 
2011 (Tang, 2010).  
    The transition from the illegal to legal was, however, not smooth.  While a large 
user population supports its subscription business, as well as online advertising, the 
legacy of piracy is continuously raising copyright concerns. In addition to litigation 
warnings from MPAA (Symonds, 2008), domestic online video service providers have 
also sued Xunlei for copyright infringement. There were  234 copyright infringement 
cases brought against the company in 2009 and 2010 (Pilarowski, 2011), a major 
reason why Xunlei withdrew its IPO application in a suspicious market in 2011. 
Despite the cancellation of IPO, Xunlei has raised U.S. legislators’ attention, with one 
Representative asking:  ‘Does the Commission have a standing policy regarding the 
approval of foreign companies to be listed on U.S. exchanges where there is 
evidence that a company’s business model is likely to be in violation of U.S. law’ 
(Tweney, 2011)? 
    Other BT sites such as yyets.net and uubird.com announced their plans to end BT 
services and focus on subtitle translation or film/TV reviews. As a result,  traffic 
decreased by 32% in the first weekend of December 2009 compared to the first 
weekend in November (Xue, 2009). It is evident from this data that video sharing and 
downloading services are core values for user communities. It turned out to be hard 
to maintain community loyalty with peripheral offerings such as subtitle translation 
or reviews.  
  
Rising copyright cost and the erosion of market positions 
In addition to the changing industry boundaries, accompanying the transition to the 
formal sector was a change in business models. With the video-sharing model based 
on UGC proving hard to monetize despite high-volume traffic, the novelty effect of 
UGC waned. Service providers began to reconsider their business models under the 
mounting pressure of revenue gains.  Professional content from traditional TV and 
film producers became highly sought-after, with a concomitant sharp increase in 
licensing costs. 
    For example, Tudou, the Chinese equivalent to YouTube, separated copyrighted 
high-definition professional content from UGC that was of less revenue-generating 
capability or had extant copyright issues. Tudou branded the former as heidou (black 
bean) in order to realize commercial benefits from advertising, while the site has 
retained other channels for UGC. At the launch, heidou offered more than 10,000 
programs including film, TV series and entertainment shows (Xin, 2008). The number 
of unique visitors reached one million within a month and the copyrighted HD 
content attracted many advertisers, mainly in FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods), 
sports apparel, and consumer electronics (Zhang, 2008). Since then the site has 
secured major Chinese content partners including China Film Group, Polybona, 
Shanghai Film Group, Enlight Pictures, BTV, SMG, as well as international partners 
including MBC in Korea, SET in Taiwan, Star TV, TVB, and ATV in Hong Kong. The 
advertising revenue grew to 443.3 million RMB by the end of 2011(70.5 million USD) 
(Tudou, 2012b).  
    Another leading video-sharing site Youku also serves as a good example of this 
transition. Since 2008 it has secured deals with more than 1000 TV production 
companies, including mainland companies as well as TVB (Hong Kong) and SBS, KBS 
and MBC (South Korea) (Youku, 2008). By the end of 2011 the site had attracted 505 
advertisers and advertising revenue had reached 851.3 million RMB (135.3 million 
USD) (Youku, 2012b). Advertising is a substantial part of the site’s overall revenue, 
contributing more than 90% to it (Youku, 2012a). Youku has also tried to expand its 
premium content library by licensing from Hollywood partners to derive revenue 
  
from user subscription. It has established partnership with Warner Bros. to introduce 
over 400 to 450 movies over a three-year period starting 2011, offering pay-per-view 
or subscription services on Youku Premium platform (Lee, 2011).  Other Hollywood 
partners include Paramount, and 20th Century Fox. Most movies on this platform 
cost 3 to 5 RMB to watch; a monthly subscription cost is 20 RMB.  
    For online video service providers, therefore, the strategy of collaborating with 
professional content producers to secure premium copyright content is critical to the 
business model based on advertising as well as to attracting users. Meanwhile, 
professional content gained further importance as new players in the online video 
sector joined in the hunt.  
Among these new players, deep-pocketed internet service providers were well-
placed in the game. For instance, the top search engine in China, Baidu, launched its 
video site Qiyi.com in early 2010. It provides viewers with a variety of licensed and 
advertising-supported HD content including TV series, films, and variety shows for 
free without foraying into UGC. Current content partners include China Film Group, 
Huayi Brothers Media Group, Hunan Satellite TV, Beijing Satellite TV, and Zhejiang 
Satellite TV. The Baidu-backed site also has a movie channel which has a library of 
more than 500 movies, both back catalogue and new releases, from Warner Bros., 
Disney, Sony, Paramount, and Fox.  
The growing demand for copyrighted professional content resulted in continuously 
escalating acquisition costs. In 2006, service providers could purchase the online 
copyright of 1,000 movies for 300,000 RMB; in 2011 this amount could only fetch 
one episode of a TV drama (Zhang, 2011).  For overseas copyright content, the costs 
are even higher. Yet this did not prevent the well-financed service providers from 
investing in overseas copyright. For instance, after acquiring ku6, Shanda announced 
together with Sohu in December 2009 that they would invest 10 million USD in a 
new fund to purchase Hollywood film and TV content licenses (Li, 2009).  
    For weakly financed online video sites, the licensing fees of American content are 
excessive (Zhang, 2010). Meanwhile, the less expensive acquisition costs for East 
Asian content, such as those from Korea and Japan, means that East Asian pop 
  
culture gains more presence on online video sites in China. Together with cultural 
proximity this availability further solidifies the positioning of East Asian content in 
China.  Moreover, the difficulty of obtaining certain content enhances the cultural 
capital of those who can access such content. This in turn generates a sense of 
cultural superiority, echoing a widely circulated internet meme ‘disdain chain’ [bishi 
lian] (Shen, 2012). In the case of TV drama, users share the view that UK soap opera 
buffs look down upon American soap opera fans, who in turn think themselves 
superior to fans of Japanese and Korean soaps. Following at the end of the chain are 
people who are fans of Hong Kong and Taiwan dramas, Chinese domestic 
productions, and finally Thai dramas. This suggests the demand for western content 
remains underserved. It also reflects stratification among viewers because of the 
knowledge and resources required to access such content. 
    While professional copyright content promises to serve consumer demand and 
expand the market, skyrocketing costs exerted mounting pressure on online service 
providers. As the majority of viewers still enjoy a free lunch hopping between 
different service providers for content, there is an urgent need for the service 
providers to cope with the pressure of escalating costs. 
 
The responses of the formal sector 
Because of the huge investment costs in server and bandwidth, diseconomies of 
scale have long haunted online video service providers. The rising costs of copyright 
content acquisition make this problem more acute. Therefore service providers have 
started to experiment with alternative business models to offset the pressure. 
 
Teaming up to professionalize 
One strategy is to establish copyright content alliances. In Feb. 2010, Youku and 
Tudou announced they would jointly air films and television shows previously 
streamed exclusively on separate websites; they would also unite in the purchase of 
new, copyrighted content (Xin, 2010). The initiative aimed not only to save costs but 
also to fend off competition from new entrants, such as Baidu and Sohu. The 
  
partnership eventually led to a merger of the two leading companies into the biggest 
online video service firm in China, Youku Tudou Inc. in August 2012 (Gao, 2012). 
    Another example of alliance is between Tudou and LeTV. In October 2011, the two 
parties established a joint venture in an effort to reduce surging content acquisition 
costs. While Tudou has its origin in UGC and is mainly supported by advertising, LeTV 
has built one of the biggest copyright professional content libraries in China, more 
than 50,000 TV series and 4,000 movies (Tudou, 2011). Founded in 2004, LeTV 
generates revenues mainly through subscriptions, sales of syndicated television 
programmes and movies, as well as some advertising. The joint company Shanghai 
Tudou LeTV Movies and Television Ltd. is primarily engaged in licensing video 
content; it seeks exclusive licensing rights as well as sub-licensing to supplement 
each company's independent content acquisition strategies (Tudou, 2011).  
    One weakness of such resource sharing and copyright transaction is homogeneity 
in content offerings.  Online video service providers therefore needed to make more 
effort to promote their content. With the entry of traditional state-owned 
broadcasters into the online space, joint content promotion benefits both online 
video service providers and broadcasters. Sohu, for example, invested 50 million 
RMB in 2011 to promote the New Princess Huanzhu (Xin huanzhu ge ge), a TV serial 
capitalising on the breakout success of the original Princess Huanzhu (Huanzhu gege),  
which was broadcast on Hunan Satellite TV in 1998 (Wang, 2011). The serial was 
acquired as exclusive content for Sohu and Hunan TV. The cost was 30 million RMB, 
a record for TV drama (Wang, 2011).  
    Despite this new focus on premium content acquisition, exclusive offering is hardly 
a sustainable business model in China. Copyright reselling is seen as a quicker means 
to recoup investment, which was what Sohu did. Soon after it bought the rights for 
New Princess Huanzhu, LeTV, Tudou and Youku acquired the rights reportedly at a 
cost of several hundred million RMB (Wang, 2011). The demand for premium 
content from the newly capitalised video service providers ensures that premium 
titles are becoming even more expensive.  
 
  
    In addition to content acquisition by various means, in-house (co-) production is a 
way to offset the effect of the soaring licensing costs. Co-production is also a method 
to manage the risks embedded in the symmetrical lack of information in creative 
industries (Caves, 2000) and the central type of uncertainty within the film industry, 
namely, consumer demand (Franklin, 2012). A successful case of in-house content 
(co-)production is Youku Original, the company's own brand of self-produced online 
video content launched in April 2010. Under its cooperation with China Film Group, 
the two parties planned to cooperate in screenplay development, content 
production and distribution. The first initiative is to work together on 10 short films 
with a total investment exceeding 10 million RMB (Youku, 2010). Once completed, 
all of these offerings will be edited together into a longer film to be screened 
simultaneously in theatres and online. Feng Xiaogang and Ning Hao, two of China's 
best-known directors, will join as guest producers.  
    In-house content (co)-production proves to be effective in working around the 
surging licensing cost and the quality issue fraught with UGC. More importantly, 
sponsored content can be tailored to suit different brand owners and resonate with 
their target audience, and therefore appeal to advertisers.  It enhances the value of 
online video sites as a marketing platform based on joint content production.  
    On the front of content distribution, a way to reduce costs is multi-platform 
distribution. For example, Joy.cn distributes its copyrighted content to internet cafes, 
telecom operators such as China Telecom’s broadband service portal www.vnet.cn, 
as well as small and medium website affiliations. The multi-platform distribution and 
accompanying copyright transactions help deliver a better return on copyright 
investment.  
 
Commercialising UGC  
As UGC is fraught with copyright issues and inferior quality, it only adds to 
bandwidth cost without generating revenue. Yet, its value for users in terms of self-
expression and a sense of community, as well as its potential for growing revenue 
cannot be underestimated. The trend of commercializing UGC in China parallels 
  
YouTube’s strategy of promoting the professionalisation and formalisation of 
amateur media production, which has led to the rise of entrepreneurial vloggers and 
cultural intermediaries (Burgess, 2012).   
    Some UGC are spotted by advertisers as right content for marketing opportunity. 
DIY education programs are such an example. Midea, China’s domestic small home 
appliance brand, spotted ‘Sijia chufang [Private kitchen] as a product placement 
opportunity to promote its soymilk maker and juicer (Advertising Panorama, 2009). 
The video maker, Aiyo V, is a talent discovered on Youku platform, which later 
became a program producer for Youku. 
    Another way to profit from user creativity is through user-generated advertising 
(UGA). Ku6 launched a UGA competition for various brands which spans different 
sectors, including Coca-Cola, Kang Shi Fu Ice Tea in FMCG, BYD Auto, online game 
developer and operator Perfect World, mobile brand Sony Ericsson. The competition 
required users to submit self-produced videos based on the theme or elements 
provided by the advertisers. Viewer votes and comments, and sometimes 
professional judgment decided the winners, who then received 10% to 50% of the ad 
revenue and were awarded by advertisers in cash or in kind (Li, 2008). The site 
serves as a platform where it connects advertisers with its users, who are not only 
viewers but have also become producers and promoters. 
    The effort of commercializing UGC is accompanied by the formal sector’s 
experimentation with social videos. This demonstrates the incorporation of the 
informal into the formal sectors. In February 2012 Tudou launched an enhanced 
platform for Sina Weibo users to upload and share videos, becoming the first site to 
provide such functionality for users of the popular microblogging service (Tudou, 
2012a). The joint forces of the top online video site and the leading online social hub 
in China provide opportunities in facilitating user creativity in content production, 
and providing an enhanced experience of content consumption and sharing.    
    The commercialization of UGC came at a time of the rising licensing costs in an 
uncertain market. The importance of user community cannot be emphasized enough 
in a social network market, where the nature of consumer choice and producer 
  
decision making is based on others’ choices due to uncertainties about product 
quality arising from novelty or complexity, or the cost of acquiring this information 
oneself (Potts et al., 2008). Many examples of successful home-grown channels 
offered in the YouTube Playbook have built on the understanding of Youtube as a 
social network and a community rather than as an inert publishing platform 
(Burgess, 2012). The mechanisms facilitating user creativity and sharing offers 
further content production and distribution possibilities. Such adaptation under 
pressure also demonstrates the blurring line between the informal and the informal 
as the two sectors co-evolve. 
 
Conclusion 
China’s media sector has undergone significant change in the past decade, to a great 
extent as a consequence of competition. A Chinese variant of creative destruction 
has forced change in industry boundaries and entry barriers, a breakdown of 
formerly protected market positions, and reform of regulatory frameworks.  Much of 
this change has been wrought by technological developments that have made file 
sharing easier while at the same time stimulating the rise of UGC. It is interesting 
that this kind of creative destruction has occurred in online media and has replicated 
similar international moves to ‘clean up’ the problem of unauthorised file sharing 
and copyright violation. In the more traditional media of television and cinema, 
which are more tightly regulated by the state, there has been less disruption of 
business models although as we have pointed out in the case of channels such as 
Hunan TV there is increasing synergy between traditional and new media forms. 
    This article began by discussing the formal and informal economies in audio-visual 
sector in China and the evolution of the offline informal video market into the online 
world. The online video market created its own momentum on the back of the ethos 
of free downloading and the availability of peer-to-peer sharing platforms.  The 
watershed moment came when the state released the licensing in 2008, which 
changed the game for industry incumbents, forcing some into the annals of Chinese 
media history, while allowing others to ‘professionalize’; that is to observe copyright 
  
regulations, which in turn raised the cost of content acquisition, as well as impacting 
on the kinds of content acquisitions. Because of the higher cost of western content, 
cheaper East Asian content found its way into many of these sites. The tension 
between formal and informal markets however, did not disappear. Offline vendors 
of pirated product remerged.     
    The clamp down on the informal sector resulted in a loss of content diversity and 
community culture. As players experimented with alternative business models, the 
informal economy sought new means of expression. Different content strategies and 
business models emerged. While some incumbents opted for cooperation in 
copyright content acquisition, in-house content (co-) production, or multi-platform 
distribution, others experimented with the commercialization of UGC and social 
video service.  
    The online video service providers that are engaged in the commercialisation of 
UGC and social video services are more than formal publishing platforms. They are 
facilitators of informal grassroots activities.  This facilitation provides an opportunity 
to encourage non-infringing use of copyright content by users. For viewers, the new 
business models create new cultural identities and entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Meanwhile TV and film consumption is reinvented as a communal activity with the 
tag of UGC and communities. Users can bring their creativity into the formal sector; 
this perhaps is the new face of participatory culture in China. Meanwhile, underlying 
the state enforcement of western-dominated ideology of copyright is the deep-
rooted traditional conception of copyright as public or common good. This still 
remains very relevant in the informal sector, which is increasingly merging with the 
formal sector.    
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